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UTILITARIAN PRACTICi\L ETHICS: 

SlDGWICK .AND SINGER 

Henry Sidgwick and Peter Singer are 1:\vo of the most important 
utilitarian moralists. Unsurprisingly, they have much in common, 
including a commitment to a sophisticated form of utilitarianism 
and to a broadly foundationalist view of epistemic justification 
in ethics. Their commonalities extend to their attitudes toward 
practical ethics, which will hereafter be my focus. Both share a 
keen sense of the importance of moral philosophy to practkal 
ethics. In his Pmctical Ethics, Sidt,l'wick argues that "the effort to 
construct a Theory of Right is not a matter of mere speculative 
interest, but of the deepest practical import".l In the preface to 
the first edition of Tile i\1ethodr of Ethz't:I' he explains that although 
his main aim is to 
concentrate the reader's attention, from first to last, not on the practical 
results to which our methods lead, but on the methods themselves ... 
I am occupied from Erst to last in considering how conclusions arc to 
be rationally reached in the familiar matter of our common daily life 
and actual practice.2 
In his most recent intellectual autobiography, Singer remarks that 
it is important that philosophy, and especially ethics, should reach out 
beyond the academy and show the public as a whole that it has some­
thing significant to sa),3 
1 Sec Henry Sidgwick, "The Aims and l'vlethods of an Ethical Society", in 
Prattical Ethics, edited by Sissela Bok, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 
pp. 15-30, at p. 24. 
2 Sec H. Sidgwick, TheMethoris of EtiJic.r, 1st cd., London, Macmillan and 
Co., 1874; 7th cd ., 1907, reprint Indianapolis / Cambridge, Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1981, p. viii; see also p. 215. 
3 Sec Peter Singer, "An Intellectual Autobiography", in Peter Singer Under 
Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Fam His Gitics, edited by,Teffrey Schab, Chicago and 
La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 2009, p. 56. 
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In addition, both are exponents of the idea that moral philoso­
phers possess a certain sort of expertise. Sidgwick contends that 
philosophers have an important role to play in practical ethical 
theorizing because they are "experts ... persons 'who have gone 
through a thorough training in psychology, sociology, and logic".4 
In his pithy "Moral Experts", Singer argues that moral philoso­
phers are "experts in matters of morals" because their training 
makes them "more than ordinarily competent in argument and 
in the detection of invalid inferences", and because of their "un­
derstanding of moral concepts and of the logic of moral arbl'll­
ment".5 Most important of ail, both are authors of a work 
entitled Practical Ethics, in which they deal with (some of) tlle most 
pressing moral issues of their time. 
At this point, one might argue, the similarities end. Sidgwick's 
utilitarian programme has been described as "Benthamism 
grO\vn tame and sleek".6 Tn his formidable article "The Point of 
View of the Universe", Bernard Williams aCCllses Sidgwick of 
making "fairly uncritical use" of aspects of common-sense 
morality, and of relying on utilitarianism to "justify the status 
quo".' This is not an unreasonable accusation, since Sidgwick 
himself seems to suggest that one aim of the moral philoso­
pher is to "establish and concatenate at least the main part of 
the commonly accepted moral rules".8 Singer, on the other 
hand, has been described as "The Dangerous Philosopher" and 
4 See H. Sidgwick, "The Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society", in 
Practical Ethics, pp. 19-20. 
5 See P. Singer, "Moral Experts", in Analpz:r 32, 1972, pp. 115-7, at p. 117. 
6 See David G. Ritchie, "Review of H. Sidgwick, The Elements of Politid', 
in InternationalJournal ql Ethics 2, 1892, pp. 254-7, at p. 255. 
7 See Bernard Williams, "The Point of View of the Universe: Sid~vick 
and the Ambitions of Ethics", in }.tIaking JetiJe q/ hl/manity and otherphilosophical 
paper.r, 1982-1993, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 153-71, 
at pp. 159 and 154. 
8 See H. Sidb>wick, The /vlethods of Ethics, p. 373. In the same place he says 
that the "truth of a philosopher's premises will always be tested by the ac­
ceptability of his conclusions". See also p. 102. 
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as a "moral iconoclast".9 He holds that it is not the business of 
the moral philosopher to capture and explain our common­
sense moral convictions. 
No conclusions about what we ought to do can validly be drawn from 
a description of what most people in our society think we ought to 
do. If we have a soundly based moral theory we ought to be prepared 
to accept its implications even if they force us to change our moral 
views on major isslles. Once this point is forgotten, moral philosophy 
loses its capacity to generate radical criticism of prevailing moral stan­
dards, and serves only to preserve the status guo. to 
Singer hopes to "make philosophy radical by linking it more 
closely to practice" .1 1 He makes conscious efforts to popularize 
his own views. 12 Sidgwick made no such efforts. Instead, he 
claimed that "1 would not if I could, and I could not if I would, 
say anything which would make philosophy - my philosophy ­
popular".u The foregoing seems to imply that while both are ex­
ponents of a utilitarian account of morality they use it to very 
different effect. Sidgwick is a conservative about moral matters, 
<) For these monikers, see Michael Specter, "The Dangerous Philosopher", 
in Tbe NeJJ) Yorkel; September 1999 and the subtitle of Peter Sil{l!,er Under Fire. 
10 See P. Singer, "Philosophers are back on the Job", in Un.rallcti.fyil{l!, Human 
Life, edited by Helga Kuhse, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 53-65, at p. 62. 
11 See P. Singer, "An Intellectual Autobiography", in Peter Singer Under Fire: 
The lyloral Icol/oclast Faces HIS Cntits, p. 24. 
12 For example, Ibid., pp. 65-6. 
Ll See II. Sidgwick,Joumal, December 1884, in Artl1l1r and Eleanor j\1ildred 
Sidgwick, HeJJ~y SidgJlJick A 1\1emoir, London, Macmillan aml Co., 1906, reprint 
Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 396. For more on this isslle, see Stefan 
Collini, "rvfy Roles and their Duties: Sici!:,,,vick as Philosopher, Professor, and 
Public Moralist", in Hem)! Sidl;Wick. P/Y}(eediIWof tbe Britisb ,/JmdcIIJ}', edited by 
R.Harrison, Oxford, Oxt()rd University Press, 2001, pp. 9-49. 
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while Singer is a radical. I think this way of viewing the two is 
mistaken or, at the very least, overstated. Sidgwick is less conser­
vative than has been suggested and Singer is less radical than he 
initially seems. To illustrate my point, I will rely on what each has 
to say about the moral demands of suffering and destitution. 
1. 
Sidgwick begins The jvlethods q/ Etbics "vith the hope of solving 
the problem that he argues afflicts the ordinary person in her 
reasoning about what to do or be. The difficulty is that in such 
reasoning, most of us appeal to a "loose combination or confu­
sion of methods".14 UnfortLmately, this delivers plural and con­
flicting reasons for action, leaving us wondering what we ought, 
all things considered, to do. To remedy this situation, the moral 
philosopher "seeks unity of principle, and consistency of 
method".15 This involves developing a method of ethics, that is, 
"any rational procedure by which we determine what individual 
human beings 'ought' - or what it is 'right' for them - to do, or 
to seek to realise by voluntary accion".I(' 
One such method is utilitarianism: the view that an agent acts 
rightly insofar as her act produces at least as much net aggregate 
happiness as any other act she could have performed in her situ­
ation. Sidgwick devotes a considerable portion of The Methods of 
Ethics to a defense of this framework. Aspects of the argument 
are obscure and the source of some philosophical and interpretive 
controversy" but the basic features are c1ear.17 The argLlment begins 
14 See H. Sidgwick, The Metbods 0/ Etbics, p. 102. 
15 Ibid., p. 6. 
16 Ibid., p. 1. 
17 For a more detailed analysis of the argument, see J. B. Schnec\vind, Sidg­
}J)irk} Etbil:r and Victorian Moml Pbilo.ropby, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1977; and Anthony Skelton, "Sidgwick's Philosophical Intuitions", in Ftlm & 
Po/dim / Etbics &Politic.r, 10, 2008, pp. 185-209. 
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with a detailed analysis and evaluation of dogmatic intuitionism, 
the view that "certain kinds of actions are right and reasonable in 
themselves, apart from their consequences; - or rather with a 
merely partial consideration of consequences, from which other 
consequences admitted to be possibly good or bad are definitely 
excluded".18 This view combines epistemic intuitionism - the view 
that there are non-derivatively justified propositions - \-vith the po­
sition that the rules that specify the kinds of actions that are right 
are those that form the core of common-sense morality, and in­
clude requirements of justice, veracity, and benevolence, among 
others. The problem with this view is that none of the rules of 
common-sense morality actually satisfy the four conditions, "the 
complete fulfilment of which would establish a signiticant propo­
sition, apparently self-evident, in tl1e highest degree of certainty 
attainable: and which must be approximately realised by the prem­
ises of our reasoning in any inquiry, if that reasoning is to lead us 
cogently to trustworthy conclusions".19 These conditions require 
that for a proposition to be self-evident it must be "clear and pre­
cise", "ascertained by careful reflection", consistent with other 
propositions considered self-evident, and that disagreement re­
garding its trutl1 be absent or rationally explained away.2U The prob­
lem is iliat the rules of common-sense morality are either agreeable 
but unclear, or clear but disputed, or in conflict with each oilier. As 
Sidgwick puts it, "so long as they are left in the state of somewhat 
vague generalities ... we are disposed to yield them unquestioning 
assent. .. But as soon as we attempt to give them the definiteness 
which science requires, we find that we cannot do this without 
abandoning the universality of acceptance"? At best, ilie rules and 
18 Sec H. Sidgwick, TheAfethodr qf EthicJ, p. 200. 
19 Ibid., p. 338. 
C.O Ibid., pp. 338-42. 
21 Ibid., p. 342. 
600 
U!ilitarian Practical Lithic.r: Siti),11Jick (Jnti .\'in,g£!r 
principles of common-sense moralit:y provide adequate guidance 
to typical people in typical circumstances.22 
Out of his rejection of dogmatic intuitionism emerges Sidg­
wick's positive view that the only acceptable form of intuitionism 
is philosophical intuitionism, the view that there are "one or more 
principles ... absolutely and undeniably true and evident".23 On 
one (disputed) reckoning there are six philosophical intuitions, 
the most important of which seem to support utilitarianism, 
namely, that "as a rational being I am bound to aim at good gen­
erally... not merely at a particular part of it"24 and that "Happi­
ness (when explained to mean a sum of pleasures) ... [is] the sole 
ultimate end".25 These principles are abstract, making it difficult 
to infer from them what we ought to do in particular cases. Nev­
ertheless, Sidgwick holds that "Utilitarianism is ... the final form 
into which Intuitionism tends to pass, when the demand for really 
self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed".26 
Once he has arrived at utilitarianism, Sidgwick is keen to disa­
buse us of the idea that utilitarianism requires us to be impartial 
in practice. He thinks that though in theory the vie\v requires strict 
impartiality in practice it permits patterns of moral concern that 
are decidedly partialY He adopts this stance as part of an indirect 
utilitarianism.28 He thinks that deviating from the strict require­
ment of impartiality in the sort of cases that he discusses is justi­
fied on the grounds that doing so will maximize net aggregate 
happiness over the long run. This version of utilitarianism permits 
giving greater weight to oneself, one's family and one's friends and 
others with whom one has special relations.29 
22 Ibid., p. 361. 

23 Ibid., p. 102. 

24 Ibid., p. 382. 

25 Ibid., p. 402. 

26 Ibid., p. 388; see also pp. 406-7. 

27 Ibid., pp. 241-2, 382, and 430 ff. 

28 Ibid., p. 413. 

29 Ibid., pp. 431, 432ft~ 
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However, the view does not completely eliminate the impar­
tiality of utjlitarianism. He contends that we ought to treat as 
equal to our own the pain and suffering and poverty of those 
"vho find themselves, through no fault of their own, in dire cir­
cumstances. 
If I am made aware that, owing to a sudden calamity that could not 
have been foreseen, another's resources are manifestly inadequate to 
protect him from pain or serious discomfort, the case is altered; my 
theoretical obligation to consider his happiness as much as my own 
becomes at once practical; and I am bound to make as much eff()rt to 
relieve him as will not entail a greater loss of happiness to myself or 
others.-1!! 
This is a radical commitment. It seems to imply the sort of in­
junctions that Singer claims are true of the scenarios that he dis­
cusses in which one is called upon to sacrifice some resources 
and/or effort to produce a greater benefit for another. The view 
entails that if you alone happen upon a small child about to perish 
by drowning in a pond, then you ought to save her even at the 
cost of ruining your fancy new outfit.]l It also appears to entail 
that we ought to do much more to relieve the pain, the serious 
discomfort and the poverty of those living in distant foreit,J11 coun­
tries, especially where the calamities are not foreseen. This sug­
gests that at least in this case Sidgwick's utilitarianism is very far 
from being "tame and sleek" or "uncritical" of common-sense 
morality.32 
30 Ibid., p. 436. 
31 This case and others similar ones are outlined in, among other places, 
P Singer, JlJe ufo You Can Save: Acting Noll' to End WorM Poverty, New York, 
Random IIousc, 2009, pp. 3, 13-5; and P Singcr, "Faminc, Affluence, and 
Morality", in PhilosoP0' and PublicAjj{tirJ, 1, 1972, pp. 229-43, at p. 231; P Singcr, 
"The Singer Solution", in TlJe Nc}}; 101k Times MagtJ'{jne, Scptember 1999. 
32 For evidence that his radical views failed to translate into radical actions, 
see S. Collini, "1"f)' Roles and their Duties: Sidt,)"wick as Philosopher, Professor, 
and Public Moralist", in Henry Sidgwick. ProrcedilWof the Blitl~rh A Ctldem}. 
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Indeed, his endorsement of this view is a notable instance in 
which he seems to correct common-sense morality. He says at 
one point that he is not sure that the utilitarian view is "not the 
principle of general Benevolence, as recognised by the common 
sense of mankind".33 However, in his final evaluation of com­
mon-sense morality, he notes that it admits 
that we have a general duty of rendering services to our fellow-men 
and especially to those who are in special need, and that \ve are bound 
to make sacritlces for them, when the benefit that we thereby confer 
very decidedly outweighs the loss to ourselves; but when we ask how 
t~lr we are bound to give up our own happiness in order to promote 
that of our fellows, while it can hardly be said that Common Sense 
distinctly accepts the Utilitarian principle, it yet does not definitely af­
tlrm any other.34 
The practical principle that Sidgwick endorses is both much 
stronger and much more definite than what common sense ac­
cepts. Therefore, it is not implausible to conclude that his utili­
tarian programme is more radical than some critics suggest, at 
least when it comes to the reduction of (unforeseen) poverty. It 
requires not only that we help others in speciaJ need when the 
benefit to them "very decidedly" outweighs the cost to us, but 
when the benefit to them is greater than the cost to us. 
Sidgwick repeatedly refers to himself as a utilitm-ia11 in his Practical 
Ethics.35 He relies on the V1C\,V in his The Elements of Politics and The 
Pril1dplesrf PoliticaIErononry.3C> These treatises outline the utilitarian viC\,v 
3.1 See H. Sidf.,rwick, "{be lvlethodr of I:thics, p. 252; italics in original. 

34 Ibid., pp. 348-9. 3 '" 

35 See H. Sidgwick, "Public Morality", in Practical Ethics, pp. 30c 6; see also 

H. Sidgwick, "The Ethics of Religious Conformity", in Practical Ethic'S, p. 73. 
36 For a detailed and helpful analysis of these works, see Bart Schultz, 
Henry Sidguick: .qye of the Universe. An IlItelleetNal Biograp~y, Cambridge, Cam­
bridge University Press, 2004. 
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of the matters with which they deaL But should we accept the 
utilitarian view for the purpose of reasoning about practical 
moral issues? Should we accept Sidgwick's claims about the moral 
demands of pain and serious discomfort? There seems to be a 
good reason why \ve should not. The practical ethical pronounce­
ments of a utilitarian are only as good as the argument for utili­
tarianism itself Sidgwick claims that the problem for the dogmatic 
intuitionist is that her intuitions fail to satisfy the tests for self­
evidence. His acceptance of the claim that utilitarianism is justi­
fied implies that he thinks that the philosophical intuitions that 
he argues provide utilitarianism with a foundation do satisfy the 
tests. This is contestable. 
Recall that Sidgwick says of the dogmatic innlitionist's intu­
itions that "so long as they are left in the state of somewhat vague 
generalities .. , we are disposed to yield them uncluestioning as­
sent.. , But as soon as we attempt to g1ve them the definiteness 
which science requires, we find that we cannot do this without 
abandoning the universality of acceptance".37 This is a charge 
that can be made against his philosophical intuitions. Consider 
the innlition pertaining to the main element of utilitarianism, that 
"as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, - so far 
as it is attainable by my efforts, - not merely at a particular part 
of it",38 So long as it is left in this vab'ue state, it seems to garner 
agreement, It is agreed to by the ideal utilitarians G E. Moore 
and Hastings Rashdall and by deontologists like W D. Ross who 
argue that we have obligations of beneficence, But once the in­
nlition is made more precise so that it really does reveal the util­
itarian idea that one ought, as a rational being, to aim onjy at general 
good, and never at a particular part of it, then it no longer garners 
universality of acceptance, since Ross will deny it. 
37 See H. Sidgwick, TheAlethods of Ethics, p, 342, 
38 Ibid" p, 382, 
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In addition, once the notion of good is made clearer and more 
precise, agreement with the ideal utilitarians will disappear. Sidg­
wick thinks the more precise principle enjoins rational agents to 
aim at aggregate happiness or pleasure, and though the ideal util­
itarians Moore and Rashdall agree that we ought to aim at good 
generally, they reject the idea that happiness or pleasure is the 
only good. For example, Rashdall thinks that we ought to aim at 
virtue, intellectual activity, various kind of affection, and pleasure 
generally.39 A jotti01i even if Sidt"wick does manage to get agree­
ment on the claim that we ought to aim at happiness generally, 
agreement breaks down when happiness is understood to consist 
in pleasure and the absence of pain, since the notion of pleasure 
is often defined differently by different philosophers. Sidgwick 
himself seems to give various different definitions of pleasure.4o 
Therefore, we have no reason to accept Sidgwick's utilitarianism 
for the purpose of reasoning about practical moral matters. 
Sidgwick appears prepared for tl1ese objections. In PradicalEthilJ, 
his view is that resolving practical moral issues seems po.rJibie only if 
we "give up altogether the idea of getting to the bottom of things, 
arriving at agreement on the first principles of duty or tl1e Summum 
Bonum".41 In particular, we need to refrain from appealing to po­
sitions tl1at remain mired in "fundan1ent'll disagreements".42 He ad­
vocates beginning with what those "vho disagree on fundamentals 
can agree on, namely, "the particulars of morality".43 The point of 
departure is the "broad agreement in tl1e details of morality which 
39 See Hastings Rashdall, The Theor), 0/ Good and EI)il, 2 volumes, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1907. 
40 See H. Sidgwick, The Aiethods olEJhics, pp. 127, 131, 402. 
41 See H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Ijmits of the Work of an Ethical Soci­
ety", in Practica!Ethics, p. 5. 
42 See H. Sidgwick, "The Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society", in 
Practical Ethics, pp. 24 and 25; see also H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of 
the Work of an Ethical Society", in Frac/ita! Ethti'S, p. 10. 
43 Ibid., p. 7; see also H. SidW,vick, "The Aims and Methods of an Ethical 
Society", in Pmcticill Ethics, pp. 25-6. 
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we actually find both among thoughtful persons who profoundly 
disagree on first principles, and among plain men who do not seri­
ously trouble themselves about first principles",44 The object of the 
broad agreement is referred to as the "region of middle axioms".45 
The so-called axioms are, roughly speaking, the rules of common­
sense morality surveyed in Book III of The Methodr if Ethics, in­
cluding rules regarding benevolence, veracity, good faith and just 
treatrnent, among others.4(, In part, Sidgvvick's move away from ap­
peal to controversial or disputed elements of moral theories or out­
looks is driven by the recoE,>nition that astute, well-meaning, impartial 
inquirers can be led to fimdamentaUy different conclusions about 
the ultimate requirements of reason.47 These constitute "funda­
mental controversies"48 or "fundan1ental disagreements".49 
His very own attempt to "ii'ame a perfect ideal of rational con­
duct" he concluded "vas "foredoomed to inevitable failure".50 The 
failure results from the fact that he finds both rational egoism and 
utilitarianism to be equally plausible (but ultimately conflicting) 
claims about the ultimate demand of reason. He thinks it is "rea­
sonable" to hold either View.51 His remarks in PradicaiEthics make it 
44 See H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Lirnits of the Work of an Ethical So­
ciety", in Pmctical Ethics, p. 6; see also H. Sidgv\~ck, "The Aims and J\'fethods 
of an Ethical Society", in Practical Etbics, p. 26. 
45 Sec H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of the Work of an Ethical Soci­
ety", in PradicalEthicJ, p. 7. 
46 Sec H. Sidgwick, "Public Morality", in Practical EthicJ, pp. 33, 42-3. 
47 See H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of the \\/'ork of an Ethical So­
ciety", in Practiced Ethics, p. 6; see also H. Siclgvvick, "Tile Aims and NTethods 
of an Ethical Society", in Practiml EthicJ, p. 25. 
48 See H. Sid&,>wick, "The Scope and Limits of tile Work of an Ethical So­
ciety", in PmctimIIitbic.r, p. 10. 
49 See H. Sidgwick, "The Aims and Metbods of an Ethical Society", in 
Practical Ethii'S, p. 24. 
50 See H. Sidgwick, The ivIethods of Ethics, l"t ed., p. 473; see also H. Sidg­
wick, Jhe Methorls of Ethii'S, 7th ed., pp. 496-509. 
51 Sec II. Sidgwick, "Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies", in Alittrl, 
14,1889, pp. 473-87, at p. 486. 
612 
-----
Utilitarian PmctiCCl/I.'ithic.r: Sidj,'1l7ck Clnd Si'l'!,er 
plausible to hold that he thought something like this of other 
views as well. Note that Sidgwick is not it seems advocating that 
we abandon moral theories or fundamentals altogether. He seems 
to advocate that we refrain from appealing only to the elements 
upon which people do not converge. So, for example, if appeal 
to utilitarian considerations is agreed upon, the appeal is uncon­
troversial. 
Now, no specific solution follows from the recognition of fun­
damental and seemingly intractable disagreements. One option, of 
course, is to engage in a war of attrition. But this is not Sidt,Y\vick's 
strategy. He notes that to employ a moral theory or outlook in light 
of disagreement about it would be to invite "the grave drawbacks 
of sectarian rivalries and conflicts".52 To remain fixed in one's 
favoured moral theory means impeding progress in solving im­
portant practical moral questions and refusing to cooperate. 53 
Instead, he maintains that appeal to controversial fundament1.ls 
is a problematic way to approach practical ethics, since it is expres­
sive of "onesidedness".54 The mark of a "thoughtfLll" or "moral" 
person - or a person embodying the "spirit of justice"55 - is a will­
ingness to t1.ke an impartial stance to cooperate and forge lasting 
practical policies, "to compromise... even when the adjustment 
[policy] thus attained can only be rough, and far removed from 
what either party regards as ideally equitable".5(, The spirit requires 
"reciprocal aclmissions",57 making any practical ethic that unfairly 
benefits some at the expense of others objectionable. He holds 
52 See H. Sidf:,lWick, "Tbe Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society", in 
PracticalEtbic.r, p. 25. 
53 Ibid., p. 24; see also H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of the \\?ork 
of an Ethical Society", in Pradica/EthicJ, p. 6; and also H. Sidgv.rick, "The 
Morality of Strife", in Practical Ethics, p. 59. 
54 Ibid., p. 53. Altbough Sidgwick's main concern in the essay is to deal with 
the issue of war, he says that the principles for dealing with war are applicable 
to "milder conflicts". Ibid., p. 49. My suggestion is that included among these 
milder conflicts are disagreements about which practical policies to adopt. 
55 Ibid., pp. 58, 59. 
56 Ibid., p. 61. 
57 Ibid., p. 60. 
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that in cases of disagreement thoughtful people should seek com­
promise, not enforcement of their O\,vn principles.58 The spirit of 
justice requires "sympathy, and the readiness to imagine oneself in 
another's place and look at things from his point of view; and ... 
the intelligent apprehension of common interests. Tn this way we 
may hope to produce a disposition to compromise"?) 
This methodology leads him to take a different approach to tile 
moral demands of poverty, pain and serious discomfort. Tn his 
essay "Luxury;' he addresses tile issue of tile morality of luxurious 
expenditure. He begins with what he regards as a difficulty: many 
of us live in luxury, yet we want to do what is commonly regarded 
as right and are aware that living in luxury is commonly regarded 
as open to moral censure. To make sense of the extent to which 
living in luxury is defensible, he draws a distinction between luxu­
ries and necessaries. On his view, luxuries involve consumption 
that "increases pleasure without materially promoting health or ef­
ficiency",60 while necessaries are what one needs for one's physical 
and moral well-being and for efficiency in one's work or social 
role.6I He considers and rejects several different arguments against 
expenditure on luxury. He considers the utilit.'lrian complaint that 
"a man who lives luxuriously consumes what would have pro­
duced more happiness if he had left it to be consumed by others".62 
He rejects it. Instead, he adopts the view that expenditure on lux­
uries is justified when it advances knowledge andlor "the appre­
ciation and production of beauty",6.l He appears to hold the view 
58 Ibid" pp, 59-60, 
,9 Ibid" p, 61. 
W See H. Sidgwick, "LlL'mry", in Practim! EtbicJ, p, 106; see also p, 101 
01 Ibid" pp, 99, 106, 
62 Ibid" p, 109. 
63 Ibid" p, 111, He appears to think that this justifies expenditure on "liter­
ature regarded as a fine art, on music and the drama, on paintings and sculptures, 
on ornamental buildings and furniture, on t10wers and trees and landscape gar­
dening of all kinds", Ibid" p, 112, 
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that it is permissible to use resources to purchase luxuries even 
when this fails to maximize happiness and even when this fails to 
help those who are living "hard lives".&! In his essay "The Pursuit 
of Culture", he puts his view as follows: 
it would seem to me - in view of the multiple evils of the penury around 
us - a clear moral duty for most persons with ample means to restrict 
their expenditure to the minimmTI necessary for the health, and the effi­
ciency in professional or social \.vorl<, of themselves and their families. 
The superfluity could then be spent in any of the \vays of relieving dis­
tress which the Charity Organization Society would sanction ... \'Vnat 
stands in the way of this moral judgment is the widespread conviction 
that the lavish expenditure of the rich on the clements of culture, the 
means of developing and gratifying the love of knowledge and the love 
of beauty in all their various forms, meets an important social need.G" 
This suggests a plausible standard regarding our obligations to 
poverty and pain or serious discomfort. It states that we ought 
to give to the alleviation of poverty what is not devoted to our 
own and our family'S necessaries or to what advances culture, 
that is, knowledge and the production and appreciation of beauty: 
He appears to adopt this view because he thinks that there is a 
marked agreement amongst thoughtful people that culture mat­
ters.!>6 This proposal is firmly rooted in common-sense morality. 
Ttis a more precise rendition of d1e common-sense standard that 
Sidgwick rejects in The Method\" qf Ethil's, \vhich is, as noted, un­
clear on how far we are bound to give up our own happiness in 
order to promote that of our fellows. This new standard tells us 
how far we are required to go. 
There may be some worries about the view that Sidf:,Y\vick 
puts forward. We might want him to be more specific about 
64 Ibid. For further discussion, see H. Sidgwick, The ElelJletlts of Polt/its, 4th 
ed., London, Macmillan and Co., 1919, pp. 159-61. 
65 See H. Sidgwick, "The Pursuit of Culture", in Pmctiea! Ethics, p. 115. 
66 Ibid., pp. 113-6. 
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the nature of knowledge and the nature of beauty that he thinks 
it worth promoting. Presumably he considers only some k11O\vl­
edge important. But which knowledge is important and which 
knowledge is trivial? In addition, we may '"vorry that perhaps the 
standard he advocates is still too stringent and demanding to be 
agreed to. Furthermore, he has not really shown that his philo­
sophical foes accept it. These are important worries. In reply, he 
might accept that the view needs to be made more precise and 
that we need to show more clearly that the practical view in ques­
tion garners agreement without moving away from the machin­
ery on which he relies in practical ethics and which pushes him 
away from his utilitarian beginnings. 
So, Sidgwick appears in theory to have fairly radical ideas 
about our obligations to eliminate "pain or serious discomfort" or 
"poverty".67 This deflects some of the criticism according to which 
he is a conservative. However, he appears to be held back from 
advocating his utilitnrian positions for the purpose of conducting 
practical ethics on account of the sort of practical methodology 
that he adopts. This makes him conservative to some extent. But 
his view seems like it is the right view to adopt for practical ethics. 
It seems the most suitable way to handle the deep disagreements 
that exist in ethics and with which Sidbl"wick was all too familiar.68 
II. 
Like Sidgwick, Singer is committed to utilitarianism. He seeks to 
use this view in an effort to make sense of the ultimate dernands 
of morality. To establish the truth of utilitarianism he sometimes 
expresses a commitment to the sort of intuitions to which Sidgwick 
is wedded. In "Ethics and Intuitions", he argues that certain of our 
67 See H. Sidgwick, The Methods ~l Ethics, p. 436. 
68 For a defence of Sidgwick's methodology, see A. Skelton, "Henry Sidg­
wick's Practical Ethics: A Defence", in [Jtilitas, 18,2006, pp. 199-217. 
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intuitions are owed to our "evolutionary and cultural history" and 
should therefore be put aside in favour of those - perhaps like Sidg­
wick's - that have a "rational basis",'i9 He is keen to defend Sidg­
\vick's claim that "the good of anyone individual is of no more 
importance, from the point of view (if Tmay say so) of the Uni­
verse, than the good of any other".70 He does not put forward any 
procedure for separating rational intuitions from those that might 
be mistaken for rational intuitions, and so his position is less well 
developed than Sidgwick's. What he adds to the defense of Sidg­
wick's intuitions, namely, that intuitions that are the "outcome of 
our evolutionary past" are somehow less trustworthy than those 
that Sidb>wick put" forward, raises more controversial issues than it 
settles.il 1vforeover, he has no procedure for determining the truth 
of our intuitions. 
This may not trouble Singer since he appears to rely on a dif­
ferent sort of argument for the main conclusions of utilitarianism. 
In his most famous article, "l'amine, Affluence, and Morality", he 
argues for the principle that if it is in our power to prevent some­
thing bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything 
of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally speak­
ing, to do it.72 This principle explains why we ought to save a child 
from drowning in a pond at the expense of ruining our new shoes 
and our fancy new outfit. It also entails that we ought to do much 
more for the world's most impoverished citizens. Singer suggests 
that this principle implies that we ought to give to the relief of 
poverty until our giving makes us worse off than it makes any­
one else better off.73 In other words, he seems to suggest that 
69 See P. Singer, "Ethics and Intuitions", in The Journal oj litbic.f, 9, 2005, 
pp. 331-.52, at p. 351. 
70 See H Sidl:,rwick, Tbe Methods oj I:tbicJ, p. 382; see also P. Singer, "Ethics 
and Intuitions", in Tbe Journal oj Etbic'S, 9,2005, p. 351. 
71 Ibid., p. 350. 
72 See P. Singer, "Famine, Aftluence, and Morality", in Pbilosop&V and Public 
Affairs, 1, 1972, p. 231. 
73 Ibid., p. 241. 
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he can get us to the main component of utilitarianism by appeal 
to our intuitions about familiar particular cases. However, it is far 
from clear that this argument is sufficiently robust to get us all the 
way to utilitarianism since there is much dispute about what 
counts as comparable in importance to relief of severe poverty.74 
In addition, there are worries that utilitarianism is too demanding 
and that it delivers injunctions that are beyond the motivational 
capacities of the typical individual. 
In response, Singer has backed away from the utilitarian ren­
dering of this principle. Like Sidgwick, he adopts a version of in­
direct utilitarianism.iS On the basis of this view he advocates less 
demanding practical directives. In PmcticalEthics he claims that ad­
vocating t.he utilitarian standard on the question of poverty is 
problematic because it may be "counterproductive"; a more mod­
est standard will likely produce better results all things considered. 
He advocates that each rich person give about ten percent of their 
income to the relief of famine.76 In his essay "The Singer Solu­
tion",he argues on the same basis that the rich ought to give every.. 
thing that they earn over US $30,000.00 for the san1e purpose. In 
the book One U70rkfhe defends the view that those who can afford 
it give at least one percent of their annual income.77 In The L.Jfi 
You Can Save he defends the suggestion that those who are "fi­
nancially comfort.:'lble" should give five percent of tl1eir annual in­
come and tl1at the "very rich" should give more.7S In the same work 
74 For discussion, see, for example, Garrett Cullity, The A10ml Demandr of 
Affillence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004; and see also T M. Scanlon, 
What U:-'eOIlJe to .F,acb Other; Cambridge,MA, Harvard University Press, 1998. 
75 For Singer's endorsement of this view, see P Singer, Practical L:thics, 2nd 
ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 91ff 
76 See P Singer, Practim/ Ethics, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1993, p. 246. 
77 See P. Singer, One World: The E thics ~l Globalization, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2002 pp. 193, 194, and 195. 
70 See P Singer, The Llje Yoll eim Sal'f:: .Actir!gNoIJ' to E nd Workl PovertY, p. 152; 
for the details of his proposal, see Chap. 5. 
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he claims that "I think we should advocate the level of giving that 
will raise the largest possible total, and so have the best conse­
quences".79 This seems to explain why he adopts the various stan­
dards. 
But he sometimes gives a different reason for more modest 
proposals. Tn "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", he suggests a 
weaker version of the principle discussed above on f.,rt"ounds that 
some might balk at its demands. The weaker principle says that 
"we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we ... [have] 
to sacrifice something morally significant".8o He seems to think the 
weaker principle is more likely to garner agreement. A similar view 
is expressed more robustly in more recent writings. In The uJe You 
Can Save he \vrites of hoping to arrive at a reasonable public stan­
dard for giving aid. He suggests that we "use praise and blame to 
influence behavior, and the appropriate standard must be relative 
to what we can reasonably expect most people to dO".81He argues 
that this has not only to do with the typical utilitarian reasons that 
he and Sidg.vick provide. It has to do with the fact that the more 
modest/less demanding public standard is agreeable to or might 
reasonably be assumed to be agreeable to other non-utilitarian 
philosophers and to those who are not philosophers but who care 
about doing the right thing. He notes that in theory he rejects those 
philosophical v"iews which do not endorse the utilitarian implica­
tions regarding our obligations to the impoverished. However, 
in practice he thinks that the disagreements are less important 
than the agreements. As he puts it: ''Against the background of 
79 Ibid.; see also P Singer, One [forM: The Ethics of Globalization, p. 192. 
80 See P. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", in PhilosopJ!y and Public 
Affairs, 1, 1972, p. 241; see also p. 231. 
81 See P Singer, Tbe J.jIb You Can Sat'l!:Actil!f!,NoJ1' to End Wodd Poverl)l, p. 154. 
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a world in which most affluent people give only a trivial propor­
tion of their income, or none at aU, to help the poor, the agree­
ment among the four of us [Singer, Richard Miller, Brad Hooker 
and Garrett Cullity] that we all have, at a minimum, moderately 
demanding obligations to help the poor is more important than 
the differences between US".82 He appeals to these views to help 
"in answering ... [the] practical question" of \vhat standard ought 
to be publicly advocated.8} He also notes that non-philosophers 
agree on the sort of standard he goes on to argue for: "Surpris­
ingly, Americans earning less than $20,000 a year actually give a 
higher percentage of their income - a substantial 4.6 percent ­
to charity than every other income group until we get to those 
earning more than $300,000 a year".84 He might also note the 
general agreement about the particular cases he discusses and the 
weaker version of his initial principle, which imply that we have 
relatively robust obligations to those in desperate need. Singer 
thinks this agreement can function as the basis of a "realistic ap­
proach" to the relief of Llmine. 
This seems for Singer to be a new and distinct approach to jus­
tifying his claims about our obligations to the most impoverished 
citizens of the world. It is reminiscent of Sidgwick's approach, 
since it calls for agreement among philosophers, moral experts, 
and plain people who are concerned to do their duty. Its implica­
tion is that Singer advocates a less radical view than one might ex­
pect, one that calls for modest amounts of money and effort aimed 
at achieving a set of goals to do with poverty reduction that all see 
to be both realistic and compelling for their own distinct reasons. 
But this means that Singer is therefore in some sense more conser­
vative d1an is often suggested. However, as in the case of Sidgwick, 
82 Ibid. , pp. 148-9. 

83 Ibid., p. 150. 

84 Ibid., p. 166. 
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the conservatism seems to be an implication of a reasonable and 
plausible approach to practical moral issues that is the outcome 
of hoping to achieve lasting agreement and meaningful results. 
It might appear that Singer has adopted this sort of frame­
work only in the case of poverty. 1 do not think that this is true. 
Although 1 do not have the space to defend this claim, 1 think the 
view is operative elsewhere. It could plausibly explain why he ad­
vocates the policy that parents have authority over whether or not 
to euthanize a defective or severely disabled newborn with no fu­
ture of value, and why he advocates that the sum total of sustain­
able carbon emissions should be divided up equally amongst the 
world's citizens.85 
It must be admitted at this point that the evidence for attribut­
ing something like Sidgwick's view to Singer is not conclusive. 
However: e there is a difference between appealing to utilitarian 
reasoning for modest practical proposals and appealing to agree­
ment of the sort at issue here for the same purpose. It is indeed 
noteworthy that Singer gravitates toward consensus amongst 
moral philosophers/experts and those who are seriously con­
cerned to do their duty rather than some other mechanism. The 
appeal to consensus seems to have a certain plausibility and au­
thority in the case of practical ethical dunking: it entails that the 
policy can be justified to others on grounds that they accept. That 
Singer makes this appeal is perhaps an unconscious recof:,mition 
of this fact. At any rate, Singer "vould do well to heed Sidgwick's 
advice about how best to do practical ethics. It seems to be the 
only way to make progress in pratical ethics in the absence of a 
universally agreed upon moral framework. 
85 See H. Kuhse and P. Singer, Should the Ba~y Live? Theprohlem if halldirapped 
tiijantJ, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985; and see P. Singer, Olle [f,7orld: 
The Ethics if Globalizatioll, p. 43, 
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To conclude, in this paper, I have attempted to argue that 
Sidgwick is more radical about practical moral matters than he is 
often given credit for. In his defense of utilitarianism, he appears 
to advocate radical departures from common-sense morality on 
the issue of the relief of poverty. He departs from such radical 
pronouncements in his Practical EthicJ because of the plausible 
practical methodology on which he relies. This methodology 
aims for agreement on practical moral policies amongst those 
who disagree on moral fundamentals. In a series of books and 
articles Singer has argued for a more radical moral view on the 
issue of the relief of poverty However, more recently he has ad­
vocated more conservative proposals. This has to do in part with 
the fact that he appears attracted to something like the practical 
methodology on which Sidgwick relies, which may provide a 
mechanism for gradual but compelling moral change.86 
il6 I wish to thank Meena Krishnamurthy and Peter Singer for helpful com­
ments on a previous draft of this paper. 
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